Filed under: Current Issues in Credit Unions | Tags: ATM, collaboration, compliance, control, joint owners, trusts
The CIiCU hosts are:
Brian Witt
Hal Scoggins
Farleigh Wada Witt,
Attorneys at Law
121 SW Morrison Street, Suite 600
Portland, Oregon 97204
Telephone: 503-228-6044 Fax: 503-228-1741
http://www.fwwlaw.com
Guy Messick
Katherine Weber
Messick & Weber P.C.
211 North Olive Street
Media, PA 19063
Telephone 610-891-9000 Fax 610-891-9008
http://www.cusolaw.com
Faith Anderson
American Airlines Credit Union
P.O. Box 619001
MD 2100
DFW Airport, TX
75261-9001
(800) 533-0035
https://www.aacreditunion.org/default.asp
Robert Rutkowski
Shareholder
Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., L.P.A.
323 W. Lakeside Avenue, Suite 200
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
Telephone: 216-739-5004 Fax: 216-739-5642
http://www.thatcreditunionblog.com
http://www.weltman.com
Subcribe to the show via iTunes Music Store:http://phobos.apple.com/Web
Filed under: repossession
By Amanda R. Yurechko, Esq.
Does a creditor have to pay storage or repair costs to obtain a piece of property in Ohio? The answer is governed by what type of property at issue and under what type of interest the creditor is seeking recovery.
In general, an artisan’s lien is created by O.R.C 1333.41 covering all repair and materials provided to an item of personal property at the request of the owner. This lien is valid so long as the artisan remains in possession of the personal property. However, the lien is subject to any prior recorded security interest. The artisan is required to follow very specific steps in order to enforce this lien by selling the property and may not attempt to enforce the lien until a year has passed without the owner attempting to recover the property or filing litigation over the property.
This section specifically excludes motor vehicles. If the property the creditor is seeking to repossess is not a motor vehicle and therefore governed by this section, the creditor will need to determine whether a valid artisan’s lien was created, whether the artisan is still in possession of the property and whether the creditor maintains a perfected security interest in that property. If the perfected security interest pre-dates the artisan lien, the perfected security interest will win, and the creditor will not be required to pay the storage or repair costs.
A creditor’s interest in the property created by way of a levy on the property makes the creditor a “lien creditor” as defined by O.R.C. 1309.317. O.R.C. 1331.41 is silent as to the priority of a lien creditor’s lien versus an artisan’s lien. The statute does seem to create the artisan’s lien at the time of non-payment, therefore before the levy which finds the property in the artisan’s hands. Likely, the creditor attempting to recover the property through a levy will have to pay the repair and storage fees.
If the property is a motor vehicle, other rules apply. In contrast to the artisan’s lien on general property, a creditor with a lien on the title of a vehicle will not have to pay repair and storage charges to recover the vehicle.(1) However, if the vehicle is leased, the creditor will have to pay the repair and storage charges under ORC §1310.34.
In general, when the state and local government is storing a vehicle, the creditor is going to have to pay the storage costs incurred in connection with that vehicle, regardless of its lien noted on the title. For example, where the motor vehicle was seized during an arrest, O.R.C. §4511.195 requires payment of all expenses incurred with the vehicle’s removal and storage. Likewise, if the car was impounded under O.R.C. §4513.61, the creditor will have to pay to gain possession of the property.
Other types of property such as airplanes and boats are going to be subject to additional and varying statutes. The answer, therefore, is that there is no one set answer to whether a creditor will have to pay storage and repair costs when trying to gain possession of a piece of property. Each type of property will have to be viewed individually in reference to the applicable statute to determine whether a lien was created against the property that may trump the interest the creditor has in the property.
If you have any questions on this matter, please contact Ms. Amanda R. Yurechko, Esq. Amanda is an associate in Consumer & Commercial Collections, focused on the Governmental Collections, Healthcare, Commercial Collections and Commercial Business Groups at Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., LPA. She can be reached at 216.685.1060 and ayurechko@weltman.com.
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(1) See Commonwealth Loan Co. v. Berry, 2 Ohio St.2d 169, 207 N.E.2d 545; Snyder v. Ryan (1965) 2 Ohio St.2d 171, 207 N.E.2d 547.
Filed under: Uncategorized
By Andrew C. Voorhees, Esq.
If your business regularly contracts with other business entities, it is prudent to consider the applicability and benefits of commercial guaranties. A guaranty is the written promise of an individual to pay the debt of another. In a commercial setting, a guaranty is typically the promise of an owner or officer of a corporate entity to pay the debt of that corporate entity should it default on its obligation. The benefits of such an arrangement are obvious in that a commercial guaranty provides additional security and consideration for the creditor, additional incentive for the corporate entity to fulfill its obligations, and additional avenues of collection for the creditor in the event of a default.
It is first important to note that a guaranty must first take the form of a clear an unambiguous writing if the intended guarantor is to be held to the obligation. Courts construe guaranty agreements in the same manner as they interpret contracts. G.F. Business Equipment, Inc. v. Liston (1982), 7 Ohio App.3d 223, 224. One need not go beyond the plain language of the agreement to determine the parties’ rights and obligations if a contract is clear and unambiguous. Uebelacker v. Cincom, Inc. (1988), 48 Ohio App.3d 268, 271. A guarantor is bound only by the precise words of his contract. G.F. Business Equipment, Inc., 7 Ohio App.3d at 224. The guarantee must clearly manifest an intent to bind the defendant. Id. Thus, an officer of a corporation is not personally liable on contracts for which the officer’s principal is liable, unless the officer intentionally or inadvertently binds himself as an individual. Centennial Insurance Co. v. Tanny International (1975), 46 Ohio App.2d 137, 142.
A guaranty must also be in writing if it is to be enforced. Ohio Revised Code § 1335.05 (as well as many comparable state statutes nationwide) require that any agreement to charge an individual to “to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another person” be in writing if it is to be enforced in a court of law. As such, any oral promises from an individual purporting to guarantee the debt of a corporate entity or other individual will not typically be enforced without some written evidence of the agreement. The writing should also be exhaustive in noting the accounts covered by the guaranty, as well as its duration.
Once an unambiguous guaranty exists, it is especially important to ensure the signature of the guarantor binds the intended party. Many individuals attempt to add the words “president”, “officer”, “member” or some other descriptive terms to their signature on a guaranty. Some individuals add this description knowingly in an attempt to avoid personal liability. The question is whether such additions would tend to negate personal liability of the guarantor.
Whether a document has been executed in an individual or representative capacity is a question to be determined from consideration of the whole instrument in each particular case. Aungst v. Creque (1905) 72 Ohio St. 551, 555. In Aungst case the Court states:
It is undoubtedly an accepted principal of commercial law, and a general rule of the law of contracts, that where an agent signs a negotiable instrument by affixing thereto his own signature without adding the name of the principal for whom he acts, the agent so signing is himself personally bound on such instrument although he affixes the word “agent”. Such suffix, under such circumstances, being generally considered and held to be descriptio personae. And the rule is the same where an officer of a corporation without signing the corporate name of a company for whom he acts, subscribes a promissory note in his own name affixing to his signature his official title or designation, such as president, secretary, or treasurer.
Id at 553 (emphasis added). Thus, the addition of the word “president” without any reference that the individual intends to bind the corporation does not render the guaranty of a Note ambiguous or allow a defendant to deny personal liability imposed by clear an unambiguous language of that guaranty. S-S-C Co. v. Hobby Center, Inc. (1992), 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 6059, *10. In S-S-C Co., the Court held the defendant personally liable for the corporate debt and stated:
Further, the fact that Beth B. Savino wrote the word “President” beneath her signature on the guaranty does not render the guaranty itself ambiguous. The general rule of interpretation governing this kind of signature is that such words as “president” are merely descriptive of the character or capacity of the person signing the document.
Id at *8.
Two competing Ohio cases bear out the importance of the form of a guarantor’s signature on the agreement. In Westgate Village Shopping Center v. Parker (2008), 2008 Ohio 2571, a commercial tenant entered into a lease agreement for space in a shopping center. The tenant eventually fell behind on rent and the landlord sought an eviction and a Judgment for money damages against the tenant and individual guarantor on the lease agreement. On the guaranty, the alleged guarantor added the words “Executive Director” immediately beneath her signature. The guarantor intended to avoid personal liability due to this addition.
The Court held that the guarantor was personally liable for the debt, regardless of the addition to her title on the signature. The Court reasoned that the addition of the words “Executive Director” to her signature was not enough. The guarantor needed to specifically note the principal for which she was signing as an agent, which was not done here. The Court held that the words “Executive Director” were merely descriptive of the person signing the guaranty document and not enough to avoid personal liability.
The Court reached a different conclusion in George Ballas Leasing, Inc. v. State Security Service, Inc. (1991), 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 6346. In that case, an officer of a corporate lessee signed his name on a guaranty and added the word “president” to the signature.
Here, the Court held that this was enough for the officer to avoid personal liability. The Court applied a three-part test to determine whether the officer was signing the guaranty in his individual or representative capacity. The Court noted that the signature itself represents a clear indication that the signator is acting as an agent if; (1) the name of the principal is disclosed, (2) the signature is preceded by the words of agency such as “by” or “per” or “on behalf of”, and (3) the signature is followed by the title which represents the capacity in which the signator is executing the document, e.g., “Pres.” Or “V.P.” or “Agent.” The Court reasoned that the language of the guaranty was neutral and did not refer to any specific individual, that the officer’s signature was preceded by the preprinted word “by” and is followed by the word “president”. Also, the corporation of which the officer is president is on the document’s face several times. Under these facts and circumstances, the Court did not hold the officer personally liable.
In sum, it is important to furnish your personal guaranty in a way that will be enforced by the Court as desired. The guaranty must be in writing and signed in order to comply with the Ohio Revised Code. Also, the guaranty language must be clear an unambiguous. To that end, be sure that the Guaranty language states the individual’s name who is to be personally liable. Also, avoid ambiguity in the signature by preprinting the guarantor’s name under the signature line and adding the words “guarantor” or “individually”. Do not add the name of the principal business anywhere in the guaranty, and do not allow the guarantor to add his or her title to the signature or the name of the principal business. Following these guidelines will help ensure that your guaranty will be enforced as intended, and maximize security for your business.
Andrew Voorhees practices in Commercial Collections with Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., LPA, with a focus on the Commercial Banking, Commercial Business, Special Collections and Commercial/Agency Services Groups. Based in the Cleveland office, Andrew can be reached at 216.685.1050 or avoorhees@weltman.com.
By David A. Wolfe, Esq.
With the passage of the Dodd-Frank legislation in 2010, the Obama administration created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, (CFPB), as an independent bureau within the Federal Reserve System for the purpose of implementing and enforcing federal consumer financial law and providing transparency and fairness in consumer financial transactions. When the CFPB officially opens on July 21, 2011, it will enjoy broad authority over a wide range of financial matters, and while mortgages, credit cards and student loans will be the priority issues addressed in the immediate future, non-bank firms such as debt collections will be the subject of new scrutiny for the bureau. The CFPB identified these market participants as those involved in the collection of consumer debts for another entity as well as debt collectors working to recover debts purchased from another creditor. While the bureau is not permitted to regulate such firms until a director is confirmed, the CFPB is currently seeking comment on how it should supervise these firms.
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) was enacted in 1978, with no major revisions since and according to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the agency with primary oversight for the FDCPA, complaints by consumers against debt collectors rose 17% in 2010. While the agency may investigate complaints, it lacks the authority to write rules and must rely on the Department of Justice to pursue court action. As a result, the current form of the FDCPA has evolved as a result of court decisions.
Under Dodd-Frank, after July 21 the FTC will have authority to enforce the FDCPA concurrently with the CFPB, with the CFPB having the additional power to write rules and investigate and resolve complaints. In carrying out these duties, the CFPB can seek very broad remedies, including rescission or reformation of contracts, refund of money, restitution and civil money penalties. To assist with its investigative process, the CFPB is developing online and paper intake methods to collect and track consumer complaints. The database will gather and store complaints and inquiries made directly to the CFPB as well as complaints made to the FTC and referred to the CFPB.
Currently divided into several units, including research, community affairs, consumer complaints, the Office of Fair Lending and the Office of Financial Opportunity, the CFPB is attempting to ensure that the financial services marketplace is more transparent and less exploitive while remaining competitive. The CFPB is expected to act aggressively to curb perceived FDCPA abuses and the bureau’s priorities and regulatory philosophy will certainly differ from that of the FTC, which will result in new restrictions and regulations on those seeking to recover debt.
David Wolfe is an associate in Consumer Collections located in the Detroit office of Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., LPA. He can be reached at 248.362.6142 or dwolfe@weltman.com.
By Joshua D. Miron, Attorney
A recent 4th District Court of Appeal of The State Of Florida (4th DCA) decision addresses a Servicer’s ability to testify to facts derived from a computer system where the individual has no personal knowledge of the information contained therein, and further a Servicer’s ability to testify to facts derived from a prior Servicer (attached).
In brief, the 4th DCA ruled in favor of a Wellington homeowner whose bank filed documents sworn to by employees with no personal knowledge of the case. The ruling reversed in part a 2010 Palm Beach County Circuit Court summary judgment that said the homeowner owed the loan servicer an outstanding balance. That amount was based on an affidavit of indebtedness signed by an employee of the loan servicer who pulled the information from a company computer, which the 4th DCA said amounts to hearsay outside of the business records exception (Fla. Stat. 90.803(6)(a). “[The employee] did not know who, how, or when the data entries were made into [the loan servicer's] computer system,” the decision states. “[The employee] could state that the data was accurate only insofar as it replicated the numbers derived from the company’s computer system. He could not state if the records were made in the regular course of business. He relied on data supplied by [a third-party servicer], with whose procedures he was even less familiar. [He] could state that the data in the affidavit was accurate only insofar as it replicated the numbers derived from the company’s computer system. Despite [his] intimate knowledge of how his company’s computer system works, he had no knowledge of how that data was produced, and he was not competent to authenticate that data”.
Pursuant to section 90.803(6)(a), Florida Statutes, each Servicer and/or Lender should be prepared to testify through a record’s custodian: (1) the record (default, payment, non-payment etc.) was made at or near the time of the event; (2) was made by or from information transmitted by a person with knowledge; (3) was kept in the ordinary course of a regularly conducted business activity; and (4) that it was a regular practice of that business to make such a record.
Although the basis for the Court’s decision is neither new nor novel, it does serve to inform otherwise uninformed defense counsel of an issue for attack. It also has the potential effect of requiring that Lenders and Servicers provide the Court with multiple affidavits or witness testimony from multiple sources to prove the indebtedness owed.
If you have any questions on this matter, please contact Mr. Joshua D. Miron, Esq. Josh is an associate who practices in the Real Estate Default Group of Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., LPA. He can be reached at 954.740.5223 or jmiron@weltman.com.
By Brian Lauer
There are many reasons why a credit union would invest in a Credit Union Service Organization (CUSO) instead of providing the same services directly through the credit union. These reasons may be that the CUSO is a collaboration of several CUSOs to create economies of scale, that it would be too cost prohibitive to initiate the service from the ground up, or that a credit union would not be permitted to perform the service itself like insurance services. One enticing reason to invest in a CUSO is to shield the credit union from the liability associated with the services by moving operations into a CUSO.
This shield has also become important recently because the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) is questioning the sufficiency of this limitation by stating that CUSOs are creating systemic risk to the credit union industry. However, the only way CUSOs can cause systemic risk to credit unions is if a credit union investor does not maintain this shield and opens itself up to the liabilities of the CUSO. As you can see in Part 712 of the NCUA regulations, this means ensuring that the CUSO is a separate entity from the credit union in the eyes of the legal system preventing third party creditors from attaching the obligations of the CUSO to its credit union owners. If a CUSO does not maintain this separateness, a court may grant a creditor this ability, which is often called “piercing the corporate veil.” The decision to pierce the corporate veil by a court is not black and white. Instead, a judge or jury will look at many factors and weigh each of those factors to determine if the veil should be pierced. Although this doctrine is driven by state law and may be slightly different from state to state, the factors used by the courts in most states are substantially similar.
Before we discuss the factors generally analyzed by the courts, it is important to note why a creditor would feel it necessary to pierce the corporate veil, and as usual, it all comes down to money. Generally, a creditor of the CUSO will seek payment directly from the CUSO for the CUSO’s obligations, but what if the CUSO cannot meet its obligations (i.e. it does not have the money)? A creditor may look through the CUSO to its owners with the objective of getting paid. So, even though a credit union may invest in a CUSO to shield the credit union from the liability of a particular service, a third party creditor of the CUSO may try to break down that barrier to get paid, and as I have said, if it appears to a court that the CUSO is not a separate entity from its owners, the court may not honor this limitation of liability.
This is why one of the most important factors analyzed by a court is capitalization of the CUSO.
A CUSO must be adequately capitalized to meet the reasonably foreseeable obligations of the services provided by such CUSO. This takes the form of both capital infusion and reasonable errors and omissions and/or general liability insurance. If a creditor is trying to pierce the corporate veil, my first guess would be that the entity was not capitalized and insured to meet the present obligations upon it. However, the creditor must show that these obligations were reasonably foreseeable and not extraordinary. Simply not having the capital or insurance to pay every single third party claim is not enough to pierce the veil. It must be shown that the third party claim is a reasonable byproduct of conducting the business of the CUSO. It is also important to note that this is just one factor considered by a court and that not having adequate capital and insurance alone may not be enough to pierce the veil. Obviously, there are many instances where companies become insolvent and this alone is not a license to dig into the pockets of its owners.
The remaining factors deal mostly with the operations of the CUSO. Essentially, the question is whether the CUSO is formally operating as a separate entity. Your CUSO must keep accurate books and records which should include meeting minutes and resolutions of the Board. Furthermore, the CUSO must have a distinct governing body that can be comprised of employees of the credit union, but must act on their own accord. It is also important that the management of the CUSO not be controlled by a majority of the board of directors of the credit union because this gives the impression that the CUSO is merely a department of the credit union. The CUSO’s funds should not be intermingled with the credit union’s funds or misappropriated by an owner. Although this seems like common sense, this may be an issue with CUSOs owned solely by one credit union. You must ensure that the CUSO and credit union have separate operating accounts and that any exchange of funds between the two is formalized in writing and for fair consideration. Similarly, the CUSO should have separate policies and procedures. These can emulate those of a credit union but should be formally adopted by the Board of the CUSO.
As you can see, many of these corporate formalities can be handled through good books and records documenting the operations of the CUSO. There is also one document that relates specifically to examinations and corporate separateness that is incredibly important. For every CUSO investment, the NCUA requires the investor credit union to obtain an attorney opinion letter stating that the CUSO is a separate entity. To draft such a letter, the attorney will review the CUSOs books and records to ensure that the company is maintaining the corporate shield. For examination purposes, this is very important to have on file, but I think it is also important to think about in this current climate. Many companies and credit unions are having trouble, and many creditors are less and less likely to write down losses. This is leading to a lot more litigation, and that litigation is definitely touching the credit union world. You should take the time to think about these issues so that you feel more comfortable with your CUSO and the limitation of liability I am sure the credit union believes it has.
Brian G. Lauer is a partner with Messick & Weber PC in Media, PA. He can be reached at 610- 891-9000 or blauer@cusolaw.com
Filed under: Current Issues in Credit Unions | Tags: CFPB, cloud computing, CUSOs, marketing, savings lottery
The incomparable Denise Wymore joins Brian, Guy, Katherine & Rob for a spirited discussion of the following:
–Credit union marketing today.
–Cloud computing and credit unions.
–Michigan’s revolutionary savings lottery.
–CFPB
–CUSO update
–Big K Roundup.
Denise Wymore is the author of Tattoos: The Ultimate Proof Of A Successful Brand and co-author of The 2020 Vision of Marketing: A Focus on Purpose.
The CIiCU hosts are:
Brian Witt
Hal Scoggins
Farleigh Wada Witt,
Attorneys at Law
121 SW Morrison Street, Suite 600
Portland, Oregon 97204
Telephone: 503-228-6044 Fax: 503-228-1741
http://www.fwwlaw.com
Guy Messick
Katherine Weber
Messick & Weber P.C.
211 North Olive Street
Media, PA 19063
Telephone 610-891-9000 Fax 610-891-9008
http://www.cusolaw.com
Faith Anderson
American Airlines Credit Union
P.O. Box 619001
MD 2100
DFW Airport, TX
75261-9001
(800) 533-0035
https://www.aacreditunion.org/default.asp
Robert Rutkowski
Shareholder
Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., L.P.A.
323 W. Lakeside Avenue, Suite 200
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
Telephone: 216-739-5004 Fax: 216-739-5642
http://www.thatcreditunionblog.com
http://www.weltman.com
Subcribe to the show via iTunes Music Store:http://phobos.apple.com/Web